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The Obscene Record Bill:
An Examination of the
Constitutionality of
Maryland H.B. 111
by Marc Minkove

n the 1986 session of the Maryland
General Assembly a great deal of public attention was focused on the socalled "Obscene Record Bill." The introduction of this bill was an attempt to deal
with the problem of record lyrics which
various persons and organizations deemed
indecent, obscene, and harmful to the
youth of this state and the country. While
the bill was not enacted into law, it did
focus public attention on this specific
problem. One specific example of the type
of lyric that these people and groups seek
to regulate is the song "Darling Nikki,"
from Prince's Grammy and Oscar awardwinning alb1:lffi Purple Rain, which contains the following verse: "I knew a girl
named NikkiJI guess you could say she was
a sex fiend.!I met her in a hotel lobby/Masturbating with a magazine.!She said 'how'd
u like to waste sometime?/And I couldn't
resist when I saw/Little Nikki grind." 1
One particular organization, the Parents' Music Resource Center (PMRC),
was established in 1985 to help alleviate
this problem. Its mission is "to get the
music world to clean up its act." 2 The
PMRC has proposed several methods of
dealing with the problem of obscene lyrics
and their effect on children. First, they
want record companies to voluntarily label
records using a rating system similar to that
used to rate motion pictures. The rating
system would label those records whose
lyrics deal with such subjects as violence,
sex, suicide, drugs and alcohol, or the oc18- The Law ForumlFal4 1986
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cult. 3 Second, the PMRC would like all
lyrics to be printed on record covers to enable parents to better decide what their
children should listen to. 4 Finally, the
PMRC wants to establish "a nationwide
'Media Watch' to 'monitor radio and TV
stations consistently for a period of time'
and 'record the objectionable words/songs/
scenes.''' 5
Another attempt to deal with this particular problem is through the use oflegislation to protect children from these allegedly
obscene lyrics. One Maryland legislator,
Del. Joseph E. Owens, described sexually
oriented lyrics as "filth" and "slime" and
declared that its distribution is "probably
the worst type of child abuse we've got .. .
this is mass child abuse, that's what it is .. .
slime affecting children." 6 This article
will examine one such legislative attempt
to deal with this problem in light of the
constitutional limitations and practical considerations involved.
A bill was introduced in the 1986 session
of the Maryland General Assembly which
was designed to prohibit the sale, rental,
distribution, or advertising of obscene
records, tapes, or compact discs to persons
under the age of eighteen. 7 The bill, H.B.
Ill, would add phonograph records, magnetic tapes, and compact or laser discs to
the list of other obscene materials which
were already enumerated in the Maryland
statute prohibiting the sale, distribution,
or advertising of obscene materials to minors. 8 After its introduction, H.B. III

was passed by the House of Delegates by a
vote of 96 to 11.9 The bill was then sent
to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, where public hearings were held
and the bill was defeated by a vote of 7
to 4. 10
The statute, as amended by this bill,
would have read:
(a)(l) A person may not willfully or
knowingly engage in the business of
selling, showing, advertising for sale,
or distributing to any person under
the age of 18 years any still picture,
photograph, book, pocket book, pamphlet, magazine, video disc, [or] video
tape, PHONOGRAPH RECORD,
MAGNETIC TAPE, COMPACT
OR LASER DISC the cover or content of which is principally made up of
descriptions or depictions of illicit
sex, or which consists of pictures nude
or partially denuded figures posed or
presented in a manner which an average person applying contemporary
community standards would find,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient
interest and lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
(2) An owner, operator, franchisee,

manager, or any employee with managerial responsibility of a newsstand
or any other place of business may not
openly and knowingly display at the
newsstand or other place of business,
ifit is frequented by persons under the

age of18 years, any of the items whose
sale, showing, or advertising is prohibited by paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(3) Violation of this section is a misdemeanor.
(b) In this section the following words
have the meanings indicated:
(1) "Description or depictions ofillicit
sex" shall mean:
(i) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(ii) Acts of human masturbation,
sexual intercourse, or sodomy; or
(iii) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals.
(2) "Distributing" includes renting.
(3) "Nude or partially denuded figures" means:
(i) Less than completely and opaquely
covered human genitals, pubic region,
buttocks, or female breast below a
point immediately above the top of the
areola; or
(ii) Human II}ale genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered. l l
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press ...." 12
The freedoms granted by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are not and have
never been treated as absolutes. 13 There
are various types of freedoms that the Supreme Court has held to be restricted. 14
Obscenity is not within the area of the
protected speech or press under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The states
have the power to enact statutes designed
to regulate obscene materials, but such
regulations must be carefully limited. 15
After numerous efforts at defining oQscenity, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Califorma,16 finally established a three part
test for determining whether certain materials are obscene. The Miller test is as
follows:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,l1
It is clear that any material which is considered obscene for adults will also be

considered obscene for children. The problem which arises, and is particularly apparent in examining H.B. Ill, involves
regulating the distribution of material to
children which would not be considered
obscene for adults.
In order to analyze the rights of children
as to their constitutional rights, particularly First Amendment rights, it is necessary to acknowledge a child's less than full
capacity for choice. 18 Children are presumed to be incapable of making mature,
competent, and responsible choices. 19
The Supreme Court has stated that, "Children, by definition, are not assumed to
have the capacity to take care of themselves." 20
Society looks first to the parents to make
decisions on behalf of their children. 21 In
those situations "[w]here the parents lack
the [necessary] power to make their authority over the listening and reading activities of their children effective, they
may seek to invoke the [state's] power and
resources ... to reinforce their supervision." 22 "[T]he State has an interest 'to
protect the welfare of children' and to see
that they are 'safeguarded from abuses'
which might prevent their 'growth into
free and independent well-developed men
and citizens.'" 23
The Supreme Court first addressed the
problem of the state's power to regulate
children's access to materials considered
obscene to them, but not to adults, in the

1968 case of Ginsberg v. New York. 24 In
Ginsberg, the defendant was convicted for
selling "girlie" magazines to minors under
a New York State statute which prohibited
the sale to persons under seventeen years
of age of material defined to be obscene to
minors.25 The statute's definition of obscenity as to minors conformed to the Roth
test and included material which: "(i) predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is
patently offensive to prevailing standards
in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors." 26
The N ew York statute was held to be
constitutional by the Ginsberg court,
thereby establishing the constitutionality
of the variable obscenity test for minors.
The Court held that the statute, in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to
minors, did not involve an invasion of the
constitutionally protected freedoms ofminors,21 Holding that the well-being of children was within New York's constitutional
power to regulate, the Court found two interests to justify the limitations imposed
by the statute: (1) "[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that
the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our
society; "28 and (2) "The State also has an
independent interest in the well-being of
Fall, J986/The Law Forum-19

its youth." 29 Finally, the Court upheld the
statute on the basis that it was rationally
related t~ the objective of safeguarding
minors from harm. 30
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,31
the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting
the exhibition of films containing nudity
by a drive-in theatre when its screen is visible from a public street or place. Among'
the arguments made in support of the ordinance's constitutionality was that it was
"an exercise of the city's undoubted police
power to protect children." 32
The Court recognized the rule of Ginsberg that a state or municipality can adopt
regulations imposing stricter controls on
materials available to children than on
those available to adults. Minors are still
entitled to a significant portion of their
First Amendment protections and the government may only prohibit the public dissemination of protected materials to minors
if done in relatively narrow and well-defined
circumstances. 33 The city's argument was
rejected by the Court based on its finding
that the ordinance was broader than permissible. 34
The Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,35 addressed the authority of
the FCC to regulate broadcasting of indecent speech. In Pacifica, the FCC issued a
declaratory order against the broadcaster
under its power to control the use ofvulgarity in broadcasting under the statute
forbidding the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communications." 36 The case involved
the broadcasting of a monologue by comedian George Carlin, entitled "Filthy
Words," which was aired by Pacifica's
radio station in mid-afternoonY The FCC
characterized the language used in the
monologue as "patently offensive," but not
necessarily obscene. 38
Pacifica's primary constitutional claim
was that the First Amendment forbids any
abridgments of the right to broadcast material which is not obscene. 39 The Court
rejected this argument based on two distinctions between broadcasting and other
forms of communication. First, the pervasive presence of the broadcast media
allows it to confront adults with indecent material in the privacy of their own
homes. 4o Second, the Court stated that
"[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled
with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg,
amply justify special treatment ofindecent
broadcasting." 41
The Maryland proposal, H.B. 111, would
be the first statute in the country to prohibit the sale or distribution of obscene
records or tapes to minors. An analysis of
20- The Law ForumJFal~ 1986

the constitutionality of the bill, if passed,
must be based upon the principles set
forth by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg,
Erznoznik, and Pacifica and those cases
which have examined similar state and
municipal laws in light of these Supreme
Court cases.
Those cases which have examined the
constitutionality of state and local laws,
have done so on a number ofconstitutional
issues including: (1) vagueness, (2) overbreadth, (3) equal protection, and (4) prior
restraint. The challenged statutes dealt
with both the sale or distribution of obscene materials to minors and the display
of those materials.
Various state statutes and municipal
ordinances have been challenged on the
ground of vagueness. The primary concerns of the vagueness doctrine are to provide actual notice as to what the particular
statute commands or forbids and to set
forth minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. 42 The purpose of striking down
statutes which are held to be vague is to
prevent the arbitrary enforcement of laws
which fail to give notice to officials or
the public of what conduct or material is
prohibited. 43

. . . the government
may only prohibit
the public
dissemination of
protected materials
to minors if done
in relatively narrow
and well-defined
circumstances.

Those laws threatening to inhibit First
Amendment freedoms require that a more
stringent vagueness test be used. 44 The
Supreme Court has enumerated three important values which are offended in the
First Amendment area by vague laws.
First, individuals are not given fair warning of what is prohibited. Second, the lack
of precise standards permits arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Finally, vague
statutes encroach upon First Amendment
freedoms by causing citizens to forsake

engaging in protected activities for fear it
may be prohibited. 45
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in M.S. News Company
v. Casado,46 examined a Wichita, Kansas
ordinance which prohibited the promotion
of sexually oriented materials to minors.
The court found that the ordinance was
not vague and set forth three reasons for its
findings: (1) "the ordinance provides fair
warning of what is prohibited; "47 (2) it did
"not perceive any real danger of arbitrary
enforcement;" 48 and (3) it was "not persuaded that the ordinance will lead citizens
to forsake activity protected by the First
Amendment." 49
In American Booksellers Association v.
McAuliffe,50 the court held that it "must
apply the same constitutional standards relating to vagueness that it would apply ifit
were dealing with a statute pertaining to
adults." 51 The court found several grounds
to support its finding that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague. First, it found
that the language of the act was vague as to
the materials prohibited and the manner of
complying with the act.52 Second, the
court held that certain terms in the act
were without a definite meaning and,
therefore, unconstitutionally vague. 53
There have also been several state laws
and municipal ordinances which have
been challenged on the ground that they
are unconstitutionally overbroad. The
basis of the overbreadth doctrine argument
is that the particular state or local law restricts the access of both adults and minors
to materials w,hich are constitutionally
permissible. 54 The primary purpose of
striking down an overbroad statute is to
"assure the public that the dissemination
of materials protected by the First Amendment will not be suppressed." 55 The Supreme Court has stated that invalidating
legislation as overbroad on its face is "manifestly strong medicine" which should be
employed sparingly and "only as a last
resort." 56
In American Booksellers Association v.
McAultffe,57 the court addressed the issue
of whether the statute was overbroad as to
both adults and minors. The statute prohibited the sale or display of certain materials which were deemed to be harmful
to minors. The court reiterated the three
part obscenity test, as set forth in Miller,
and stated that any materials which did not
satisfy the test were protected under the
First Amendment. 58 The court examined
the act and determined that it infringes on
the protected rights of adults because
"[t]he language includes a public display
prohibition which necessarily prevents
perusal by, and limits sale to, adults." 59
The McAultffe court then compared the

Georgia statute with the New York statute
which was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Ginsberg to determine if it was overbroad as to minors. The court held the
statute to be overbroad because it lacked
the guidelines set forth in Ginsberg. 60
The court in Rushia v. Town ofAshburnham,61 examined a local ordinance prohibiting the sale or display of indecent
publications to minors, to determine if it
was constitutionally overbroad. While the
court recognized the state's interest in protecting its children allows a greater degree
of control over communicative materials
available to them,62 it found that the ordinance also infringed on the rights of
adults. 63 There were several reasons given
by the court to support its conclusion.
First, it held that the terms of the ordinance were much more sweeping than
Miller and could potentially deter a substantial range of constitutionally protected
expression. 64 Second, the ordinance was
broader than the statute upheld in Ginsberg because it was not limited to materials
which are obscene as to minors. 65
Most recently, in American Booksellers
Association, Inc. v. Virginia,66 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined
an amendment to the Virginia obscenity
statute prohibiting display of books with
sexual content deemed harmful to juveniles. 67 The court held that the amendment was facially invalid for overbreadth
because it discourages the exercise of first
amendment rights in a real and substantial
manner, and is not readily subject to a narrowing interpretation as to withstand an
overbreadth challenge. 68
The court in M.S. News Co. also addressed the question of whether the municipal ordinance in question was overbroad. 69 The ordinance was held not to be
overbroad for two reasons. First, the court
held that "the ordinance has a clear and acceptable standard that will permit sale or
distribution to adults of such materials." 70
Second, the portion of the ordinance dealing with the display of materials which are
harmful to minors is reasonably written
and any restrictions of the rights of adults
to view these materials is reasonable,11
Several cases challenging these various
statutes as unc9nstitutional have done so
on the basis that these laws are violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 One such challenge
was made in the case of M.S. News Co. v.
Casado,73 in which the ordinance in question distinguished between commercial
and non-commercial enterprises; The court,
recognizing that the material involved was
obscene and therefore not subject to First
Amendment protections, stated that "[s]uch
classifications are upheld if they are ra-

tionally related to a legitimate state interest." 74 Applying this standard, the court
determined that the distinction did bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest and that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 75
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley,76 held that a
state statute distinguishing private, commercial bookstores from other entities,
such as school bookstores, libraries, and
museums, violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The court acted under the
presumption that the materials involved
were not obscene and therefore entitled to
the freedom of speech provisions of the
First Amendment. 77
When fundamental rights, such as the
First Amendment right of free speech, are
affected, the classifications in terms of the
ability to exercise these rights must be
judged against a strict scrutiny test. 78 The
burden is upon the government to establish that the law is necessarily related to a
compelling governmental interest. 79 The
court in Tattered Cover concluded that
"there is no compelling or overriding justification shown by the state in this case
which supports the classification." 80
The argument has also been made th'at
these statutes and ordinances create an impermissible prior restraint on an individual's freedoms of speech and expression.
Generally, the government may not regulate in advance what expressions may be
uttered or published, even if such speech
would be unconstitutional if spoken or
published. 81 The Supreme Court has expressed its preference for subsequent punishment rather than allowing prior restraint. 82 A system involving any form
of prior restraint on speech bears a heavy
presumption against its constitutional
validity.83
In M.S. News Co. v. Casado,84 the court
rejected a prior restraint argument for two
reasons. First, there is no provision in the
ordinance for a prior administrative determination of whether the material involved
is obscene. 85 Second, there was no significant risk that a person may be prosecuted
for engaging in protected conduct. 86
Since the Maryland bill was first introduced, 'various persons and organizations
have expressed reservations about the bill.
State Senator Mike Miller, Jr., Chairman
of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, expressed his fear that the bill
would have a "chilling effect" on artists. 87
A local 'organization known as the Recording Retailers Opposing Censorship (RROC)
expressed its view that "[t]he action not
only violates the recording artists' constitutional right to free speech, but usurps
parental responsibility for children's de-

velopment." 88 The RROC also found it
unconscionable that the legislature would
decide for parents what music their children should listen to and take the right of
judgment on impressionability from the
parents' hands. 89 Rock musician Frank
Zappa, who testified in opposition of the
bill, stated that the bill would force artists
to censor their work in order to comply
with the act.90 Another opponent of the
bill, Barry Lynn of the American Civil
Liberties Union, stated that "[t]he bill is
absurd and unconstitutional, and goes beyond any accepted definition of obscenity."91 While not getting involved in the
Maryland bill, the PMRC has stated that
it does not endorse the legislative approach
as a means of dealing with the problem. 92
The Maryland bill must now be examined in terms of its constitutionality and
practical effectiveness. While the present
Maryland act has not been challenged on
constitutional grounds, the Attorney General of Maryland has issued an Opinion
advising the Governor as to the constitutionality of a bill before the Maryland
Legislature amending section 419. 93 The
Attorney General found two possible
problem areas with that bill: (1) the portion of the bill which applies to the cover
of certain material fails to satisfy the requirement ofMiller that the work be "taken
as a whole;" 94 and (2) the bill does not
require that the proscribed material be
"patently offensive" to the average person
applying contemporary community standards. 95 The Opinion stated that the dissemination of material to minors which is
indecent and offensive, but not necessarily
obscene, could be constitutionally restricted. 96 This conclusion was based on
the Supreme Court's holdings in Ginsberg
and PaCIfica that a statute aimed at protecting children need not meet the standards
set forth in Miller. 97
The act must also be examined in light
of the decisions which have addressed similar statutes. 98 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that obscene materials are
not subject to the protections of the First
Amendment. 99 The Court, in Ginsberg,
gave its approval to state statutes prohibiting the distribution and display of material
which is considered obscene to minors,
but not obscene to adults. 100 The holdings
of those courts which have examined similar statutes in light of Ginsberg will also
help analyze the Maryland law's constitutionality.
The argument can easily be made that
the Maryland act is unconstitutionally
vague. The values that the Supreme Court
has stated must be protected, and may all
be offended by the bill. lol First, persons
are not given fair and adequate warning of
Fa/~ 1986rrhe Law Forum-21

what materials are prohibited. l02 Since
terials to minors may only be done in "relarecords and tapes ha ve not previousl y been
tively narrow and well-defined circumregulated, it will be hard for record retailstances." III The court in Pacifica did not
ers to know which materials are obscene.
overrule the holding in Ginsberg that states
Second, the lack of precise standards
could prohibit the dissemination of mamay permit the law to be enforced arbiterials which are obscene as to minors, but
trarily and discriminatorily.l03 Without a
made its decision based on the context in
clear indication of what materials are prowhich the communication was expressed. I 12
hibited, law enforcement officials may apThe Maryland bill does not appear to
ply their own standards which are not
make distinctions which would subject it
likely to be consistent.
to claims of unconstitutionality on equal
Finally, the statute may cause persons
protection grounds. 113 One argument
not to engage in activities that are constiwhich can be made is that the law distintutionally protected, for fear that these acguishes between those persons who distivities are prohibited. 104 The most likely
tribute these obscene records and those
group of persons to be affected are record
persons who broadcast these same maand tape retailers, who may not sell various
terials. The former are covered by the law,
materials to minors although they may not
while the latter are not. However, while
be considered obscene. The statute could
broadcasters are not subject to the law,
also have a chilling effect on the freedom
their actions are subject to regulation in
of speech rights of recording artists, who
light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Pacifica. 114
may have to alter their work to comply
with the law. lOS Since minors constitute a
The argument that the bill would be unsubstantial portion of the record buying
constitutional as a prior restraint on the
public, the artists may have to err on the
right of free speech is also likely to be unside of cautiousness to prevent their records
successful. While prior restraints on First
from not being able to reach that particular
Amendment rights are strongly disfavored
group.
by the courts, any such restraint, ifit does
The Maryland bill is also subject to atexist, is implied in the law. The two reatack on the ground that it is overbroad.
sons given by the court in M.S. News Co.
The main purpose behind declaring a law
v. Casado are also present here.ll5 First,
to be unconstitutionally overbroad is to
the Maryland bill does not require that
protect the dissemination of constitutiona prior administrative determination be
ally protected materials. 106 It is the fear . made as to whether the material is obscene.
that this dissemination of protected maThere is no requirement that a censor board
terials will be prohibited which explains
screen every record before it is made availwhy this bill may be overbroad.
able to the public. Second, there is no indication that the law will be enforced in
While states are permitted to enact stasuch a way as to provide a substantial risk
tutes which exercise a greater degree of
of prosecution for engaging in protected
control over the materials available to
minors, the states may not do this at the
activities. 1l6
expense of the constitutional rights of
There are also several reasons why the
adults.l07 There are two major problems
enactment of H.B. III is impractical, as
with the Maryland bill. First, the proviwell as possibly unconstitutional. First,
this is an area in which parents, and not the
sion of the act prohibiting the display of
materials which are in violation of the act
state, should be making the decision as to
denies access to these materials to adults. lOS
what their children should be listening to.
The government should not step in and
Without displaying these records, adults
usurp the parents' rights and responsibiliwill not be able to purchase these materials
ties in raising their own children. Second,
in many instances, because they will not
the determination of which records and
know that these materials are available.
Second, the terms of the act are more
tapes are obscene will be hard for police,
prosecutors, and judges to make. There
sweeping than those guidelines set forth in
Miller and Ginsberg. 109 The guidelines in
are no precise standards which can be used
the Maryland act do not require that the
to define whether a particular record is obmaterials be taken as a whole and they do
scene. There are many songs whose lyrics
are subject to different interpretations.
not require that the materials be harmful
The artists claim that the lyrics have one
to minors. While the Attorney General has
meaning, while groups such as the PMRC
stated that this discrepancy is not relevant
allege that the lyrics have another obscene
because of the state's power to regulate
meaning. 117 This creates a problem in deindecent or offensive material as to chiltermining how far parties can go to find
dren,"O this power is not without its rethat a record violates the law. Third, the
strictions. The Supreme Court has held
bill creates possible economic problems
that the dissemination of protected ma22- The Law ForumJFa/~ 1986

for record retailers. Since the bill prohibits
the display of these materials, the retailers
will be forced to remove the records from
their display shelves and place them out of
the public's view. This will substantially
impair the sales of these records to all persons because the displaying of these products is an integral part of the marketing
and sales practice for records. Finally, the
bill may have a reverse effect which could
increase the problem. In many cases, the
children who purchase these records are
unaware of the explicit lyrics. By singling
out certain records as obscene, this may induce children to obtain these records and
pay more attention to the lyrics.
Despite the fact that H.B. III failed to
be enacted into law by the Maryland General Assembly in 1986, it is apparent that
this bill, or a similar version of the bill,
will be introduced again in 1987. While
there are doubts as to the constitutionality
of such a bill, there are stronger doubts as
to its need and possible effectiveness. While
acknowledging that many of the lyrics are
offensive and tasteless, the legislators must
be careful not to usurp the responsibilities
of the parents in controlling the listening
habits of their children.
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